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Elliott, J.H. Scots & Catalans: Union and Disunion. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2018. Xii + 339 pp.  
 
Over a seven-decade career writing political, biographical, and national 
histories rich in detail, J.H. Elliott has earned a reputation for painstaking research, 
dispassionate assessments, and admirable prose. Now he wants to know why two 
European peoples, the Scots and the Catalans, have attempted (again and again) to 
challenge their subordination to England and Castilian Spain. He seeks an answer 
in a comparison of their histories. He puts up a good fight against some confounding 
methodological difficulties but, in the end, a straightforward answer to the 
multigenerational rabble-rousing of his subjects eludes him. 
The author sees plenty of similarities in the historical trajectories of 
Scotland and Catalonia over roughly 500 years: medieval monarchies shaped the 
territorial limits and institutional features of each region, then dynastic accidents 
brought each into the unions that became Great Britain and Spain. The earliest 
manifestations of these unions were composites in which monarchs protected the 
legal and cultural distinctiveness of each of their kingdoms or principalities. As 
monarchies became empires and then nation-states, advisers and lieutenants gained 
advantage for the political centers, making Scotland and Catalonia peripheral 
adjuncts. Scots and Catalans rebelled against these conditions in the 1640s but lost. 
In the early eighteenth century, authoritarian governments, threatened by 
international conflicts, tightened their hold and increased restrictions. The dispatch 
of Philip V’s Nueva Planta decrees in 1716 revoked Catalonia’s privileges and 
imposed new legal, institutional, and military controls. When repression arrived in 
Scotland at the end of the Jacobite Rising in 1745, Scots in the Highlands, already 
marginalized, were further reduced to a Gaelic-speaking minority. Both Scotland 
and Catalonia industrialized late in the eighteenth century. Both felt the 
reverberating effects of the French and American revolutions and suffered the 
social upheavals that came with the rise of Liberalism and other ideological 
currents. In the period of nineteenth-century Romanticism, historians, writers, and 
folklorists elaborated and reified the myths upon which they could assert claims to 
a national consciousness. Into the twentieth century, some Scots and Catalans found 
justification in their invented national identities to assert cultural distinctiveness 
and to radicalize claims for political separation. The evolution of sophisticated 
political parties and civil society institutions into the twenty-first century gave 
impetus to emboldened secessionist demands. 
That these similarities are meant to give the book its basic structure is 
evident in the table of contents, which shows Elliott shoehorning his similarity-
seeking agenda into a tight-fit chronology: 1. Dynastic Union, 1469-1625; 2. 
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Rebellion and Its Aftermath, 1625-1707/1716; 3. Incorporating Unions, 1707-
1789; 4. Nations and States, 1789-1860; 5. The Call for Home Rule, 1860-1975; 6. 
Breaking Away? 1975-2017. The construction is presented as unproblematic, but 
readers should be forgiven for seeing the chronology as a textbook rendering and 
the themes as superficial. We can rightly wonder whether a story that begins for 
Catalonia in 1410 or 1469 can be so neatly fit to a story that begins for the Scots in 
1603. And why start the stories there anyway? Elliott’s points of departure signal 
preconceptions and prejudices that shape the narrative uncomfortably. The early 
pages oversimplify basic cultural distinctions. I am not Catalan, but I can appreciate 
that many Catalan readers of the book will argue with good conscience that any 
story about Catalonia that does not begin deeper in the medieval period will get 
basic premises wrong. Similarly, the story of the Scots insufficiently identifies the 
cultural elements – religious difference being key among them – that separated the 
Scots from the English at the moment of union. Later, as when discussing the period 
of rebellions after initial union, the author is not keen to emphasize the 
contingencies that make each situation distinct. 
Elliott is engaged in exploring how the paths traveled by Scots and Catalans 
differ as well as converge, but how he presents these differences confirms the 
arbitrary, even illusory, nature of the perceived similarities. To take one example, 
Elliott notes that industrialization came to both locales through the manufacture of 
textiles, but the differences obliterate the value of the parallelism. Scotland’s output 
made it a cog in the wheel of Great Britain’s robust and diversified industrial 
economy, with the result that Scottish industry made Scotland more British. 
Catalonia’s textile industry made it the economic powerhouse of an otherwise 
backward-looking Spanish economy dominated by a retrograde agriculture. That 
Madrid preyed upon the Catalan economy gave Catalans one of many reasons to 
harden their resistance. The author approaches some differences with timidity, 
obfuscating the weight they deserve.  He hardly notices the fact that Catalonia had 
to defend itself from two hungry neighbors since at least the thirteenth century 
(France only gets bit-player status here). Elsewhere he posits controversial claims 
with such ease as to make them seem incontrovertible: that Catalonia was never a 
state; that the value Catalans give to their language as a cultural indicator is a 
Romantic invention (Gaelic, he says, was never of much consequence to the Scots 
either); that Catalan successionists are fanatics, a minority who impose themselves 
with the pretense of a majority upon a population that vacillates between 
disoriented or hapless. Readers may agree with the author, or they may question his 
motives.   
To assert that historical context can tell us something about recent 
successionist moves requires a theory about the discursive relationship between 
past, present, and future. In his book of autobiographical reflections on the 
historical profession, History in the Making (Princeton: Yale University Press, 
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2012), Elliott tells us that theory gets in the way of his pragmatism. That is a smoke 
screen, since careful readers can intuit not only that he holds theoretical 
predilections but that they are ill-fitted to his task. One is that governance and the 
decisions of contending elites are of greater consequence, of a higher order, than 
sloppy change from below. While Great Britain and Spain need no explaining (no 
matter that the loss of Empire and the Brexit fiasco throw shade on Great Britain’s 
exceptional ego, and no matter that many who know the history of Spain consider 
it a repeat-offender failed state), Scotland and Catalonia remain “lesser polities” of 
questionable relevance. Second, he is dismissive of manifestations of culture, of the 
construction of identity, of the productive capacity of myth and memory, and of the 
possibility that a state can inflict long-lasting trauma on its own people. A third 
guiding position, one that subsumes the first two, has it that time is the most 
powerful agent of change. This is tricky. Elliott can be adept at describing the 
seriousness of momentary conflicts even while relentlessly piling evidence upon 
evidence to the end that change always seems to brush the past under its rug. 
Leaders and those who struggle against them may try to steer the world this way or 
that, but they inevitably get set adrift, rocked to and fro by exigencies that they 
cannot anticipate and that they never fully comprehend. The problem here is that 
fatalism cannot answer the question Elliott asks. Some successionist movements 
have very deep roots. In seeking to learn why it is that their emotional batteries get 
recharged time and again, the answer has to go beyond identifying dynastic foibles 
or fleeting successes or failures in diplomacy. It has to take account of the 
psychology, sociology, and anthropology of humanity’s use of the past to change 
the present.  
Near the end of the book, Elliott asserts “Spain after 1978 was an infinitely 
more benign country than the Spain of General Franco” (270).  Such relativism is 
undoubtedly true for those who ignore the damage done by the past to the present. 
It also forgets that events in the present can reawaken ancestral spirits and reopen 
old wounds. 
 
Michael Vargas 
State University of New York at New Paltz 
 
Vargas, Michael A. Constructing Catalan Identity: Memory, Imagination, and 
the Medieval. Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. Pp. xii, 197.  
 
While a nation is a social construction, no nation can be simply constructed, 
as the failed example of Padania vividly testifies. To be built socially, a nation must 
contain the raw materials for its building, and a sense of a shared history is an 
essential component to such a project. Furthermore, there needs to be a degree of 
societal consensus around its constituent parts. We should not see these parts as 
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